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MEAN-FIELD BACKWARD-FORWARD STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
AND NONZERO SUM STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
YINGGU CHEN, BOUALEMDJEHICHE AND SAID HAMADE`NE
ABSTRACT. We study a general class of fully coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equa-
tions of mean-field type (MF-BFSDE). We derive existence and uniqueness results for such a system
under weak monotonicity assumptions and without the non-degeneracy condition on the forward
equation. This is achieved by suggesting an implicit approximation scheme that is shown to con-
verge to the solution of the system of MF-BFSDE. We apply these results to derive an explicit form of
open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies for nonzero summean-field linear-quadratic stochastic differ-
ential games with random coefficients. These strategies are valid for any time horizon of the game.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We study the solvability of the following backward-forward stochastic differential equation of
mean-field type (MF-BFSDE): for every t ≤ T,
Xt = x+
∫ t
0 f (s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))ds+
∫ t
0 σ(s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))dWs,
Yt = g(XT,PXT)−
∫ T
t h(s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))ds−
∫ T
t ZsdWs,
(1.1)
where W := (Wt)t≤T is a standard Brownian motion on Rm defined on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P), P(Xt,Yt) is the t-marginal distribution of (Xt,Yt) and f , h, σ and g are Lipschitz con-
tinuous functions with appropriate dimensions.
This class of MF-BSDEs appears in the analysis of optimal control problems (the stochastic max-
imum principle) and nonzero-sum games related to nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems of
McKean-Vlasov type (see e.g. [AD11,BDL11,BLM16,CD13,CD15,DH18], the list of related papers
being far longer). It is an extension of the standard BFSDEs studied in several papers including
[Ant93,Ham98,HY00,HP95,MPY94,MPQ14,PW99,HP95].
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Under Lipschitz continuity andmonotonicity conditions on the coefficients we derive existence
and uniqueness results for the system (1.1). Compared with e.g. [CD13], we do not require non-
degeneracy of the diffusion coefficient of the forward process. We further allow it to depend on
Z.
The monotonicity condition appears first in the paper by Hu and Peng [HP95] in order to rem-
edy the assumption related to the length T of the horizon [0, T] when dealing with the existence
and uniqueness of the solution to the standard backward-forward SDE (equation (1.1) when the
coefficients f , g, h and σ do not depend on ν). See also [Ant93] for more details. Subsequent
papers on the solvability of standard BFSDEs where the monotonicity condition is substantially
weakened include [Ham98,PW99].
As mentioned above, when the data f , g, h and σ do not depend on ν, the monotonicity condi-
tion is sufficient to obtain existence and uniqueness of a solution to the standard BFSDE. There-
fore, an important issue is, beside the monotonicity condition, what kind of assumptions should
be further imposed on the data (especially w.r.t. ν) in order to obtain existence and uniqueness of
a solution to the mean-field BFSDE (1.1). We show that if the Lipschitz constants of f , g, h and σ
w.r.t. ν are small enough then (1.1) has a unique solution. When σ does not depend on ν, we give
a refinement of that result, under a relaxed monotonicity condition. This feature on σ appears
in the study of some linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential games, which we consider in the
second part of this paper.
In the second part of the paper we deal with the linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential
game. The coefficients are stochastic processes and not necessarily deterministic. By using the
stochastic maximum principle for optimal stochastic control problems obtained in [AD11], we
reduce the problem of existence of Nash equilibrium point (NEP for short) of the game to the
solution of an associated MF-BFSDE of the type considered in the first part. Then, we provide
conditions on the data of the game under which this latter MF-BFSDE has a unique solution and,
consequently, the game has a NEP for any horizon T whose explicit expression is also given. To
the best our knowledge, this result seems new. Finally, there are some (rather few) other papers on
linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential games including [TDaH18,MP19], whose frameworks
are however different from ours. Actually, in [TDaH18], the main tool is the square completion
technique, and in [MP19], themethod is based on the resolution of the associated Riccati equation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the problem and present our
main results about existence and uniqueness of solutions to two classes of MF-BFSDEs under
two different sets of monotonicity conditions, (H1) and (H1′). In Section 3, we derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of open loop Nash equilibrium strategies for an n-
players nonzero sum mean-field linear-quadratic SDEs with random coefficients. Moreover, we
give an explicit form of those strategies. Finally, we give a counterexample to show that a Nash
equilibrium may not exist when the monotonicity condition on the coefficients is not satisfied.
2. MEAN-FIELD BACKWARD-FORWARD STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
Before we describe the framework defining the system of backward-forward SDEs, we intro-
duce the Wasserstein distance between two probability measures. Denote by M2(R
k) the set
of probability measures on Rk with finite moments of order 2. For µ1, µ2 ∈ M2(Rk), the 2-
Wasserstein distance is defined by the formula
d(µ1, µ2) := inf
{(∫
Rk×Rk
|x− y|2F(dx, dy)
)1/2
; F(.,Rk) = µ1, F(R
k, .) = µ2
}
(2.1)
i.e., the infimum is taken over F ∈ M2(Rk × Rk) with marginals µ1 and µ2. It has also the
following formulation in terms of a coupling between two square-integrable random variables ξ
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and ξ ′ defined on the same probability space (Ω,F ,P):
d(µ, ν) = inf
{(
E
[
|ξ − ξ ′|2
])1/2
, law(ξ) = µ1, law(ξ
′) = µ2
}
, (2.2)
fromwhich is derived the following inequality involving theWassersteinmetric between the laws
of the square integrable random variables ξ, ξ¯ and their L2-distance:
d2(Pξ ,Pξ¯ , ) ≤ E[|ξ − ξ¯|2], (2.3)
where Pξ := law(ξ) and Pξ ′ := law(ξ
′).
Next let (Wt)0≤t≤T denote a standard m-dimensional Brownian motion, defined on the prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P), whose natural filtration is (F 0t )0≤t≤T, where F 0t = σ(Ws, s ≤ t) and we
denote by F := (Ft)0≤t≤T its completion with the P-null sets of F . Let P be the σ-algebra of
F-progressively measurable sets on [0, T]× Ω. Set Rm+m+m×m := Rm × Rm × L(Rm;Rm) and
letM2,k denote the space of P-measurable and Rk-valued processes which belong to L2([0, T]×
Ω, dt⊗ dP). Next, we introduce the following spaces:
(i) S2,m is the space of continuous P-measurable Rm-valued processes ζ := (ζt)t≤T such that
E[supt≤T |ζt|2] < ∞ ;
(ii) H2,m×m is the space of P-measurable Rm×m-valued processes θ := (θt)t≤T such that
E[
∫ T
0 |θt|2] < ∞.
For x, y ∈ Rm, x · y denotes the scalar product and for any A, B ∈ L(Rm,Rd), [A, B] = ∑dj=1 Aj.Bj,
Aj, Bj being the jth columns of A and B, respectively. Furthermore, for u = (x, y, z) ∈ Rm+m+m×m,
we set ‖u‖2 := |x|2 + |y|2 + ‖z‖2, where ‖z‖2 = trace(zz⊤); (⊤) is the transpose operation.
We make the following assumptions.
(1) g is a function defined on Ω×Rm ×M2(Rm) and valued in Rm such that,
(a) for any (x, µ) ∈ Rm ×M2(Rm), g(x, µ) is F 0T-measurable and square-integrable;
(b) g is Lipschitz in (x, µ) uniformly in ω ∈ Ω, i.e. there exists positive constants Cνg and
Cxg such that, for any x, x
′ ∈ Rm and any ν, ν′ ∈ M2(Rm),
|g(x, µ)− g(x′, µ′)| ≤ Cxg |x− x′|+ Cνgd(µ, µ′), P-a.s. (2.4)
(2) f , h and σ are functions defined on [0, T]×Ω×Rm+m+m×m ×M2(Rm ×Rm), valued re-
spectively in Rm,Rm and L(Rm;Rm) and satisfy
(a) For any ν ∈ M2(Rm×Rm), u = (x, y, z) ∈ Rm+m+m×m, the processes ( f (t, u, ν))0≤t≤T,
(h(t, u, ν))0≤t≤T and (σ(t, u, ν))0≤t≤T belong respectively toM2,m,M2,m andM2,m×m.
(b) f , h and σ are Lipschitz in (x, y, z, ν) uniformly in (t,ω) ∈ [0, T]× Ω, i.e. for ϕ =
f , b, σ, there exist positive constants Cνϕ and C
u
ϕ such that for any t ∈ [0, T], u =
(x, y, z), u′ = (x′, y′, z′) ∈ Rm+m+m×m, ν, ν′ ∈ M2(Rm ×Rm)
|ϕ(t, u, ν)− ϕ(t, u′, ν′)| ≤ Cuϕ ‖u− u′‖+ Cνϕ d(ν, ν′), P-a.s. (2.5)
Hereafter, we will use Cu := max(Cuf ,C
u
h ,C
u
σ) and C
ν := max(Cνf ,C
ν
h ,C
ν
σ) as common Lipschitz
constants of f , h and σ w.r.t. u and ν, respectively.
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A solution to the backward-forward stochastic differential equation associated with ( f , σ, h, g)
is a triple of processes (X,Y,Z) := (Xt,Yt,Zt)t≤T which is Rm+m+m×m-valued such that
X,Y ∈ S2,m , Z ∈ H2,m×m ;
Xt = x+
∫ t
0 f (s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))ds+
∫ t
0 σ(s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))dWs, t ≤ T;
Yt = g(XT ,PXT)−
∫ T
t h(s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))ds−
∫ T
t ZsdWs, t ≤ T.
(2.6)
Next, for t ∈ [0, T], ν ∈ M2(Rm × Rm), u = (x, y, z) and u′ = (x′, y′, z′) in Rm+m+m×m, we
define the function A by
A(t, u, u′, ν) := ( f (s, x, y, z, ν)− f (s, x′, y′, z′, ν)) · (y− y′)
+(h(s, x, y, z, ν)− h(s, x′, y′, z′, ν)) · (x− x′)
+[σ(s, x, y, z, ν)− σ(s, x′, y′, z′, ν), z− z′].
(2.7)
We consider the following assumption.
(H1)

(i) there exists k > 0, s.t. for all t ∈ [0, T], ν ∈ M2(Rm ×Rm), u, u′ ∈ Rm+m+m×m,
A(t, u, u′, ν) ≤ −k(|x− x′|2 + |y− y′|2 + |z− z′|2), P-a.s.
(ii) there exists k′ > 0, s.t. for all ν ∈ M2(Rm ×Rm), x, x′ ∈ Rm,
(g(x, ν)− g(x′, ν)) · (x− x′) ≥ k′|x− x′|2, P-a.s.
Remark 2.1. In the case when A and g do not depend on ν, Assumption (H1) appear first in a
paper by Hu-Peng [HP95] to study the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the backward-
forward SDE (1.1) in the framework where the coefficients do not depend on ν. This assumption
is then weakened in several papers including [Ham98], [PW99].
In the next sectionwe prove existence and uniqueness of the solution of system (2.6) of backward-
forward SDEs under the assumptions (H1).
2.1. Existence and uniqueness results under (H1).
Theorem 2.2 (Existence and Uniqueness of a solution). Let assumption (H1) hold. If the constant
Cνg ,C
ν satisfy the inequality
Cνg ,C
ν
< min{(
√
3− 1)k′,
√
3
3
k} (2.8)
then there exists a unique process U = (X,Y,Z) which solves the system (2.6) of Backward-Forward SDE
of mean-field type.
Proof. (i) Existence of a solution: Let δ > 0 and consider the sequence Un = (Xn,Yn,Zn)n≥0 of
processes defined recursively as follows: (X0,Y0,Z0) = (0, 0, 0) and, for n ≥ 0,Un+1 satisfies, for
every 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 
Un+1 = (Xn+1,Yn+1,Zn+1) ∈ S2,m ×S2,m ×H2,m×m ;
Xn+1t = x+
∫ t
0
{
f (s,Un+1s , ν
n
s )− δ(Yn+1s −Yns )
}
ds
+
∫ t
0
{
σ(s,Un+1s , ν
n
s )− δ(Zn+1s − Zns )
}
dWs,
Yn+1t = g(X
n+1
T , µ
n
T)−
∫ T
t h(s,U
n+1
s , ν
n
s )ds−
∫ T
t Z
n+1
s dWs,
(2.9)
where νnt := P(Xnt ,Ynt ) and µ
n
T := PXnT . By Theorem 1.2 in [Ham98] (see also [HP95], pp.282 or
[PW99], pp.833), the system (2.9) admits a unique solution. First we will show that (Un)n≥0 is a
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Cauchy sequence inM2,m+m+m×m and (XnT)n≥0 is a Cauchy sequence in L2(dP). For n ≥ 1, t ∈
[0, T], set
Xˆn+1t := X
n+1
t − Xnt , Yˆn+1t := Yn+1t − Ynt , Zˆn+1t := Zn+1t − Znt (2.10)
and for ϕ = f , h, σ,
ϕ̂n+1(t) := ϕ(t,Un+1t , ν
n
t )− ϕ(t,Unt , νn−1t ),
ϕn(t) := ϕ(t,Unt , ν
n
t )− ϕ(t,Unt , νn−1t ).
(2.11)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
Xˆn+1T · Yˆn+1T − Xˆn+10 · Yˆn+10 =
∫ T
0 Yˆ
n+1
s · { fˆ n+1(s)− δ(Yˆn+1s − Yˆns )}ds
+
∫ T
0 Yˆ
n+1
s · {σˆn+1(s)− δ(Zˆn+1s − Zˆns )}dWs
+
∫ T
0 Xˆ
n+1
s · hˆn+1(s)ds+
∫ T
0 Xˆ
n+1
s · Zˆn+1s dWs
+
∫ T
0 [σˆ
n+1(s)− δ(Zˆn+1s − Zˆns ), Zˆn+1s ]ds.
(2.12)
Furthermore, using standard estimates of BSDEs and the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, it
is easy to see that the stochastic integrals in (2.12) are true martingales. We may take expectation
to obtain
E[Xˆn+1T · (g(Xn+1T , µnT)− g(XnT, µn−1T ))] + δE
[∫ T
0
(|Yˆn+1s |2 + ‖Zˆn+1s ‖2) ds]
= δE
[∫ T
0
(
Yˆn+1s · Yˆns + [Zˆn+1s , Zˆns ]
)
ds
]
+E
[∫ T
0
(
Xˆn+1s · hˆn+1(s) + Yˆns · fˆ n+1(s) + [σˆn+1(s), Zˆn+1s ]
)
ds
]
.
(2.13)
Using the Lipschitz continuity of g, Young’s inequality, (2.3) and (H1(ii)), we have, for any ε > 0,
E[Xˆn+1T · (g(Xn+1T , µnT)− g(XnT, µn−1T ))]
= E[Xˆn+1T · (g(Xn+1T , µnT)− g(XnT, µnT))] + E[Xˆn+1T · (g(XnT, µnT)− g(XnT, µn−1T ))]
≥ k′E[|Xˆn+1T |2]− CνgE[|Xˆn+1T |]d(µnT, µn−1T )
≥ k′E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνgε
2
E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνg
2ε
d2(µnT , µ
n−1
T )
≥ (k′ − C
ν
gε
2
)E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνg
2ε
E[|XˆnT |2]. (2.14)
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Again, by the Lipschitz continuity of f , h, σ, Young’s inequality, (2.3) and (H1(i)), we also have,
for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T and any α > 0,
Xˆn+1t · hˆn+1(t) + Yˆn+1t · fˆ n+1(t) + [σˆn+1(t), Zˆn+1t ]
= A(t,Un+1t ,Unt , νnt ) + Xˆn+1t h¯n(t) + Yˆn+1t · f¯ n(t) + [σ¯n(t), Zˆn+1t ]
≤ −k
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2 + ‖Zˆn+1t ‖2
}
+ |Xˆn+1t ||h¯n(t)|+ |Yˆn+1t || f¯ n(t)|+ |σ¯n(t)||Zˆn+1t |
≤ −k
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2 + ‖Zˆn+1t ‖2
}
+ Cνd(νnt , ν
n−1
t )
(
|Xˆn+1t |+ |Yˆn+1t |+ |Zˆn+1t |
)
≤ −k
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2 + ‖Zˆn+1t ‖2
}
+ C
ν
2α
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2 + ‖Zˆn+1t ‖2
}
+ 3αC
ν
2 d
2(νnt , ν
n−1
t ).
Now since d2(νnt , ν
n−1
t ) ≤ E[|Xˆnt |2 + |Yˆnt |2], we have
E
[∫ T
0
(
Xˆn+1s · hˆn+1(s) + Yˆn+1s · fˆ n+1(s) + [σˆn+1(s), Zˆn+1s ]
)
ds
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
(
(C
ν
2α − k)
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2 + ‖Zˆn+1t ‖2
}
+ 3αC
ν
2 E[|Xˆnt |2 + |Yˆnt |2]
)
ds
]
.
(2.15)
On the other hand, in view of Young’s inequality, we also have, for any ρ > 0,
E
[∫ T
0
(
Yˆn+1s · Yˆns + [Zˆn+1s , Zˆns ]
)
ds
]
≤ 12E
[∫ T
0
(
ρ|Yˆn+1s |2 + ρ‖Zˆn+1s ‖2
+ 1ρ |Yˆns |2 + 1ρ‖Zˆns ‖2
)
ds
]
.
(2.16)
Applying now (2.14), (2.15) and (2.16) to (2.13), yields
(k′ − C
ν
gε
2 )E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνg
2ε E[|XˆnT |2] + δE
[∫ T
0
(|Yˆn+1s |2 + ‖Zˆn+1s ‖2) ds]
−E
[∫ T
0 (
Cν
2α − k)
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2 + ‖Zˆn+1t ‖2
}
dt
]
≤ δE
[∫ T
0
(
ρ
2 |Yˆn+1s |2 + ρ2‖Zˆn+1s ‖2 + 12ρ |Yˆns |2 + 12ρ‖Zˆns ‖2
)
ds
]
+ 3αC
ν
2 E[
∫ T
0
{|Xˆnt |2 + |Yˆnt |2} dt].
Rearranging terms, we obtain
(k′ − C
ν
gε
2 )E[|Xˆn+1T |2] + E
[∫ T
0 (k− C
ν
2α )|Xˆn+1t |2ds
]
+
E
[∫ T
0 (δ(1−
ρ
2 ) + k− C
ν
2α )
(|Yˆn+1s |2 + ‖Zˆn+1s ‖2) ds]
≤ C
ν
g
2ε E[|XˆnT |2] + E
[∫ T
0
(
3αCν
2 |Xˆns |2 + ( δ2ρ + 3αC
ν
2 )|Yˆns |2 + δ2ρ‖Zˆns ‖2
)
ds
]
.
By setting
λ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) := min{k′ − C
ν
gε
2 , k− C
ν
2α , δ(1− ρ2 ) + k− C
ν
2α },
θ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) := max{C
ν
g
2ε ,
δ
2ρ +
3αCν
2 },
we obtain
E[|Xˆn+1T |2] + E
[∫ T
0 ‖Uˆn+1s ‖2ds
]
≤ θλ
(
E[|XˆnT |2] + E
[∫ T
0 ‖Uˆns ‖2ds
])
. (2.17)
Now, if there exist α, ε, δ and ρ so that
λ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) > θ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) (2.18)
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then the inequality (2.17) becomes a contraction, which implies that (XnT)n≥0 is a Cauchy sequence
in L2(Ω,P) and (Xn)n≥0, (Yn)n≥0 and (Zn)n≥0 are Cauchy sequences in L2([0, T]× Ω, dt⊗ dP).
Therefore going back to (2.9), using Itoˆ’s formula and, by now standard calculations, we obtain
E[sup
s≤T
(|Xns − Xms |2 + |Yns −Yms |2)]→ 0 as n,m→ ∞.
Consequently, there exist F-adapted continuous processes X and Y and an F-progressively mea-
surable process Z such that
E[sup
s≤T
(|Xns − Xs|2 + |Yns −Ys|2) +
∫ T
0
‖Zns − Zs‖2ds]→ 0 as n→ ∞.
Moreover ,
E[sup
s≤T
(|Xs|2 + |Ys|2) +
∫ T
0
‖Zs‖2ds] < ∞.
Finally, taking the limits in equation (2.9) we obtain that (X,Y,Z) is a solution of MF-BFSDE (2.6).
Next, we are going to show that such α, ε, δ and ρ exist when the condition (2.8) is satisfied. In
fact, to make the contraction meaningful, we assume k′ − C
ν
gε
2 , k− C
ν
2α and 1− ρ2 are positive. It is
easily shown that (1− ρ2 ) ≤ 12ρ and the terms of this inequality are equal if and only if ρ = 1. So
let us take ρ = 1 and set
θ∗(ǫ, α) = lim
δ→0
θ(ǫ, δ, α, 1) = max{C
ν
g
2ε
,
3αCν
2
}
and λ∗(ǫ, α) = lim
δ→0
λ(ǫ, δ, α, 1) = min{k′ − C
ν
gε
2
, k− C
ν
2α
}.
Now if, for some ǫ, α, we have λ∗(ǫ, α) > θ∗(ǫ, α), then there exists δ small enough such (2.18) is
satisfied with those ǫ, α, δ and ρ = 1. Finally, in order to have λ∗(ǫ, α) > θ∗(ǫ, α), it is equal to
have the following inequalities: 
k′ − C
ν
gε
2
>
Cνg
2ε
k− C
ν
2α
>
Cνg
2ε
k− C
ν
2α
>
3αCν
2
k′ − C
ν
gε
2
>
3αCν
2
.
(2.19)
For these inequalities, noticing that
Cνgε
2 +
Cνg
2ε ,
Cν
2α +
3αCν
2 reach their minimum when ε = 1 and
α =
√
3
3 , respectively. To give a sufficient condition on C
ν
g ,C
ν, we choose α =
√
3
3 , ε = 1, and set
γ1, γ2 > 0 to be the coefficients satisfying C
ν
g ,C
ν < min{γ1k, γ2k′}.
If γ1k ≤ γ2k′, then, (2.19) holds if the following system of inequalities hold.
k′ > Cνg
k >
√
3Cν
k−
√
3γ1k
2
>
γ1k
2
k′ − γ1k
2
>
√
3γ1k
2
.
(2.20)
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From the third inequality, we obtain γ1 <
√
3− 1. For the forth inequality in (2.20), it is enough
to show
γ1k
γ2
− γ1k
2
>
√
3γ1k
2
,
which means γ2 <
√
3− 1. It is easily checked that we obtain the same result under the other
condition γ1k > γ2k
′. Finally, compared with Cν <
√
3
3 k, we obtain the sufficient condition
Cνg ,C
ν < min{(√3− 1)k′,
√
3
3 k} for which γ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) < θ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) when ρ = ε = 1, α =
√
3
3 and
δ > 0 is small enough. 
(ii) Uniqueness of the solution: Let U′ = (X′,Y′,Z′) be another solution to (2.6). Set
ΓT := E
[∫ T
0 {( f (s,U′s, ν′s)− f (s,Us, νs)) · (Y′s −Ys)
+(h(s,U′s, ν′s)− h(s,Us, νs)) · (X′s − Xs)
+[σ(s,U′s, ν′s)− σ(s,Us, νs),Z′s − Zs]} ds] .
(2.21)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to the product (X′T − XT) · (Y′T − YT) and taking expectation, we obtain
E[(X′T − XT) · (Y′T −YT)] = ΓT . (2.22)
In view of (H1), (2.3) and the Lipschitz continuity of f , h, σ and g, and the Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality we have
ΓT = E[(X
′
T − XT) · (Y′T −YT)] ≥ k′E[|X′T − XT |2]− CνgE[|X′T − XT |]d(µ′T, µT)
≥ k′E[|X′T − XT |2]− CνgE[|X′T − XT |]E[|X′T − XT |2]
1
2
≥ (k′ − Cνg)E[|X′T − XT |2].
Therefore,
ΓT ≥ (k′ − Cνg)E[|X′T − XT |2]. (2.23)
On the other hand, we have
ΓT ≤ E
[∫ T
0 {A(s,Us,U′s, νs) + (Cν|X′s − Xs|+ Cν|Y′s −Ys|+ Cν‖Z′s − Zs‖)d(νs, ν′s)} ds
]
.
But
d(νs, ν
′
s) ≤
√
E[|X′s − Xs|2 + |Y′s −Ys|2].
Therefore, by the use of Young’s inequality three times we obtain
ΓT ≤E[
∫ T
0
{
−k(|X′s − Xs|2 + |Y′s −Ys|2 + ‖Z′s − Zs‖2) +
Cν
2
(3α+
1
α
)|X′s − Xs|2+
Cν
2
(3α+
1
α
)|Y′s − Ys|2 +
Cν
2α
‖Z′s − Zs‖2
}
ds]. (2.24)
Now, combine (2.23) and (2.24) to obtain
(k′ − Cνg)E[|X′T − XT |2] + kE
[∫ T
0
(|X′s − Xs|2 + |Y′s − Ys|2 + ‖Z′s − Zs‖2)ds
]
≤ E[
∫ T
0
{
Cν
2
(3α+
1
α
)|X′s − Xs|2 +
Cν
2
(3α+
1
α
)|Y′s −Ys|2 +
Cν
2α
‖Z′s − Zs‖2
}
ds]
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or
0 ≤ (k′ − Cνg)E[|X′T − XT |2] ≤ E[
∫ T
0
{
[
Cν
2
(3α+
1
α
)− k]|X′s − Xs|2+
[
Cν
2
(3α+
1
α
)− k]|Y′s −Ys|2 + [
Cν
2α
− k]‖Z′s − Zs‖2
}
ds].
Noticing now that Cνg ,C
ν ≤ min{(√3− 1)k′,
√
3
3 k}, with α =
√
3
3 , all the coefficients of the right
hand side of the above inequality are negative, which implies that, P-a.s. for all 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
X′s = Xs, Y′s = Ys, and Z′s = Zs, ds⊗ dP-a.e. Thus the solution of (2.6) is unique. 
2.2. Existence and uniqueness results when σ does not depend on the mean-field term.
Assuming σ does not depend on P(Xt,Yt) i.e. the MF-BFSDE (2.6) becomes: ∀t ≤ T,
X,Y ∈ S2,m and Z ∈ H2,m×m;
Xt = x+
∫ t
0 f (s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))ds+
∫ t
0 σ(s,Xs,Ys,Zs)dWs, t ≤ T,
Yt = g(XT,PXT)−
∫ T
t h(s,Xs,Ys,Zs,P(Xs,Ys))ds−
∫ T
t ZsdWs, t ≤ T.
(2.25)
In this framework, the condition (H1) can be relaxed to the following assumption.
(H1′)

(i) there exists k > 0, s.t. for all t ∈ [0, T], ν ∈ M2(Rm ×Rm), u, u′ ∈ Rm+m+m×m,
A(t, u, u′, ν) ≤ −k(|x − x′|2 + |y− y′|2), P-a.s.
(ii) there exists k′ > 0, s.t. for all ν ∈ M2(Rm ×Rm), x, x′ ∈ Rm,
(g(x, ν)− g(x′, ν)) · (x− x′) ≥ k′|x− x′|2, P-a.s.
Following similar steps as in the proof of Theorem 2.2, we have the following:
Theorem 2.3 (Existence and Uniqueness of a solution). Let Assumption (H1′) hold. If the constants
Cνg ,C
ν, k, k′ satisfy the inequalities
Cνg ,C
ν
< min{2(
√
2− 1)k′,
√
2
2
k}, (2.26)
then there exists a unique process U = (X,Y,Z) which belongs to S2,m × S2,m ×H2,m×m and which
solves the MF-BFSDE (2.25).
Proof: (i) Existence of a solution: Let δ > 0 and consider the sequence Un = (Xn,Yn,Zn)n≥0 of
processes defined recursively as follows: (X0,Y0,Z0) = (0, 0, 0) and, for n ≥ 0,Un+1 satisfies, for
every 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 
Un+1 = (Xn+1,Yn+1,Zn+1) ∈ S2,m ×S2,m ×H2,m×m ;
Xn+1t = x+
∫ t
0
{
f (s,Un+1s , ν
n
s )− δ(Yn+1s −Yns )
}
ds
+
∫ t
0 σ(s,U
n+1
s )dWs,
Yn+1t = g(X
n+1
T , µ
n
T)−
∫ T
t h(s,U
n+1
s , ν
n
s )ds−
∫ T
t Z
n+1
s dWs,
(2.27)
where νnt := P(Xnt ,Ynt ) and µ
n
T := PXnT . By Theorem 1.2 in [Ham98] (or [PW99], pp.833), the system
(2.27) admits a unique solution. Wewill show that (Un)n≥0 is a Cauchy sequence inM2,m+m+m×m
and (XnT)n≥0 is a Cauchy sequence in L
2(dP). For n ≥ 1, t ∈ [0, T], recall the processes Xˆn+1,
Yˆn+1, Zˆn+1, ϕ̂n+1 and ϕn defined respectively in (2.10) and (2.11).
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Applying Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
Xˆn+1T · Yˆn+1T − Xˆn+10 · Yˆn+10 =
∫ T
0 Yˆ
n+1
s · { fˆ n+1(s)− δ(Yˆn+1s − Yˆns )}ds
+
∫ T
0 Yˆ
n+1
s · σˆn+1(s)dWs
+
∫ T
0 Xˆ
n+1
s · hˆn+1(s)ds+
∫ T
0 Xˆ
n+1
s · Zˆn+1s dWs
+
∫ T
0 [σˆ
n+1(s), Zˆn+1s ]ds.
(2.28)
Similarly as above, we take expectation to obtain
E[Xˆn+1T · (g(Xn+1T , µnT)− g(XnT, µn−1T ))] + δE
[∫ T
0 |Yˆn+1s |2ds
]
−E
[∫ T
0
(
Xˆn+1s · hˆn+1(s) + Yˆns · fˆ n+1(s) + [σˆn+1(s), Zˆn+1s ]
)
ds
]
= δE
[∫ T
0 Yˆ
n+1
s · Yˆns ds
]
.
(2.29)
Using the Lipschitz continuity of g, Young’s inequality, (2.3) and (H1′(ii)), we have, for any ε > 0,
E[Xˆn+1T · (g(Xn+1T , µnT)− g(XnT, µn−1T ))] = E[Xˆn+1T · (g(Xn+1T , µnT)− g(XnT, µnT))]
+E[Xˆn+1T · (g(XnT, µnT)− g(XnT, µn−1T ))]
≥ k′E[|Xˆn+1T |2]− CνgE[|Xˆn+1T |]d(µnT, µn−1T )
≥ k′E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνgε
2 E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνg
2ε d
2(µnT , µ
n−1
T )
≥ (k′ − C
ν
gε
2 )E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνg
2ε E[|XˆnT|2].
(2.30)
Again, by the Lipschitz continuity of f , h, σ, Young’s inequality, (2.3) and (H1′(i)), we also have,
for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T and any α > 0,
Xˆn+1t · hˆn+1(t) + Yˆn+1t · fˆ n+1(t) + [σˆn+1(t), Zˆn+1t ]
= A(t,Un+1t ,Unt , νnt ) + Xˆn+1t · h¯n(t) + Yˆn+1t · f¯ n(t)
≤ −k
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2
}
+ |Xˆn+1t ||h¯n(t)|+ |Yˆn+1t || f¯ n(t)|
≤ −k
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2
}
+ Cνd(νnt , ν
n−1
t )
(
|Xˆn+1t |+ |Yˆn+1t |
)
≤ −k
{
|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2
}
+ C
ν
2α |Xˆn+1t |2 + C
ν
2α |Yˆn+1t |2 + αCνϕ · d2(νnt , νn−1t ).
Since d2(νnt , ν
n−1
t ) ≤ E[|Xˆnt |2 + |Yˆnt |2], then
E
[∫ T
0
(
Xˆn+1s · hˆn+1(s) + Yˆn+1s · fˆ n+1(s) + [σˆn+1(s), Zˆn+1s ]
)
ds
]
≤ E ∫ T0 ((Cν2α − k)(|Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2) + αCνϕE[|Xˆnt |2 + |Yˆnt |2]) ds. (2.31)
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Furthermore, we have, for any ρ > 0,
E
[∫ T
0 Yˆ
n+1
s · Yˆns ds
]
≤ 12E
[∫ T
0
(
ρ|Yˆn+1s |2 + 1ρ |Yˆns |2
)
ds
]
. (2.32)
Applying now the three inequalities (2.30), (2.31) and (2.32) to (2.13), yields
(k′ − C
ν
gε
2 )E[|Xˆn+1T |2]−
Cνg
2ε E[|XˆnT |2] + δE
[∫ T
0 |Yˆn+1s |2ds
]
−E
[∫ T
0
{
(C
ν
2α − k) · |Xˆn+1t |2 + (C
ν
2α − k) · |Yˆn+1t |2 + αCνϕE[|Xˆnt |2 + |Yˆnt |2]
}
ds
]
≤ δE
[∫ T
0
(
ρ
2 |Yˆn+1s |2 + 12ρ |Yˆns |2
)
ds
]
.
Rearranging terms, we obtain
(k′ − C
ν
gε
2 )E[|Xˆn+1T |2] + E
[∫ T
0 (k− C
ν
2α )|Xˆn+1t |2ds
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
(
δ(1− ρ2
)
+ k− Cν2α )|Yˆn+1s |2ds
]
≤ C
ν
g
2ε E[|XˆnT |2] + E
[∫ T
0
(
αCν|Xˆns |2 + ( δ2ρ + αCν)|Yˆns |2
)
ds
]
.
Taking ρ = 1, we obtain
(k′ − C
ν
gε
2 )E[|Xˆn+1T |2] + E
[∫ T
0 (k− C
ν
2α )|Xˆn+1t |2ds
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
(
1
2 δ+ k− C
ν
2α )|Yˆn+1s |2
)
ds
]
≤ C
ν
g
2ε E[|XˆnT|2] + E
[∫ T
0
(
αCν|Xˆns |2 + ( 12δ+ αCν)|Yˆns |2
)
ds
]
.
Let us set
λ(ǫ, δ, α) := min{k′ − C
ν
gε
2
,
1
2
δ+ k− C
ν
2α
},
θ(ǫ, δ, α) := max{C
ν
g
2ε
,
1
2
δ+ αCν}.
(2.33)
Then, it holds that
E[|Xˆn+1T |2] + E
[∫ T
0 |Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2ds
]
≤ θλ
(
E[|XˆnT|2] + E
[∫ T
0 |Xˆn+1t |2 + |Yˆn+1t |2ds
])
.
(2.34)
Now, if there exist α, ε, δ so that θ < λ, the inequality (2.34) becomes a contraction. Thus, (XnT)n≥0
is a Cauchy sequence in L2(Ω,P) and (Xn)n≥0 and (Yn)n≥0 are Cauchy sequences in L2([0, T]×
Ω, dt⊗ dP).
To make the contraction meaningful, we assume k′ − C
ν
gε
2 and k− C
ν
2α are positive. Next, similarly
to Theorem 2.2, since δ > 0 can be chosen small enough, we only need to solve the following
system of inequalities (which stem from the limits of λ and θ as δ→ 0):
k′ − C
ν
gε
2
>
Cνg
2ε
k− C
ν
2α
>
Cνg
2ε
k− C
ν
2α
> αCν
k′ − C
ν
gε
2
> αCν.
(2.35)
12 YINGGU CHEN, BOUALEMDJEHICHE AND SAID HAMADE`NE
As in the proof of Theorem 2.2, for those inequalities, we choose α =
√
2
2 , ε = 1 and set γ3, γ4 > 0
to be the coefficients satisfying the Cνg ,C
ν < min{γ3k, γ4k′}. Assuming γ3k ≤ γ4k′, (2.35) holds if
the following system of inequalities holds:
k′ > Cνg
k >
√
2Cν
k−
√
2γ3k
2
>
γ3k
2
k′ − γ3k
2
>
√
2γ3k
2
.
(2.36)
From the third inequality, we obtain γ3 < 2(
√
2 − 1). For the forth inequality in (2.36) to be
satisfied, it is enough to have
γ3k
γ4
− γ3k
2
>
√
2γ3k
2
which means γ4 < 2(
√
2− 1) . The result under the other condition γ1k > γ2k′ turns out to be
the same, as it can be easily checked. Finally, compared with Cν <
√
2
2 k , we obtain a sufficient
condition Cνg ,C
ν < min{2(√2 − 1)k′,
√
2
2 k} satisfying γ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) < θ(ǫ, δ, α, ρ) , when ε = 1,
α =
√
2
2 and δ > 0 is small enough.
We now show that (Zn)n≥0 is also a Cauchy sequence in L2([0, T]×Ω, dt⊗ dP) .
For n,m ≥ 0, we have
d(Ynt − Ymt ) = (h(t,Unt , νn−1t )− h(t,Umt , νm−1t ))dt+ (Znt − Zmt )dWt.
By applying the Itoˆ formula and then taking expectation, we obtain
E[|YnT −YmT |2 − |Ynt −Ymt |2] = E[
∫ T
t
{
2|Yns −Yms ||h(s,Uns , νn−1s )− h(s,Ums , νm−1s )|+ ‖Zns − Zms ‖2
}
ds].
In view of the Lipschitz condition on the coefficients and Young’s inequality, we have, for any
β > 0,
E
∫ T
t
‖Zns − Zms ‖2ds = E[|YnT − YmT |2 − |Ynt −Ymt |2] + E
∫ T
t
2|Yns − Yms ||h(t,Uns , νn−1s )− h(t,Ums , νm−1s )|ds
≤ E[|YnT − YmT |2] + E[
∫ T
t
2Cu|Yns −Yms | {|Xns − Xms |+ |Yns − Yms |
+ ‖Zns − Zms ‖}+ 2Cν|Yns −Yms |d(νn−1s − νm−1s )ds]
≤ E[|YnT − YmT |2] + E[
∫ T
t
{
2Cu|Yns − Yms | {|Xns − Xms |+ |Yns − Yms |}+
1
2β
‖Zns − Zms ‖2
+2β(Cu)2|Yns −Yms |2 + Cν{(|Yns − Yms |)2 + E[|Xn−1s − Xm−1s |2 + |Yn−1s − Ym−1s |2]}
}
ds].
Let β = 1 and t = 0. We then have
1
2
E
∫ T
0
‖Zns − Zms ‖ds ≤ E[|YnT − YmT |2] + E
[∫ T
0
{
2Cuϕ|Yns −Yms | {|Xns − Xms |+ |Yns − Yms |}
+ 2(Cu)2|Yns −Yms |2 + Cν{|Yns −Yms |2 + E[|Xn−1s − Xm−1s |2 + |Yn−1s − Ym−1s |2]}
}
ds
]
.
(2.37)
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Since (XnT)n≥0 is a Cauchy sequence in L
2(Ω,P) and (Xn)n≥0 and (Yn)n≥0 are Cauchy sequences
in L2([0, T]×Ω, dt⊗ dP), (Zn)n≥0 is also a Cauchy sequence in L2([0, T]×Ω, dt⊗ dP) . Therefore,
by standard calculations, we also have
E[sup
s≤T
(|Xns − Xms |2 + |Yns −Yms |2)]→ 0 as n,m→ ∞.
Consequently, there exist F-adapted continuous processes X and Y and an F-progressively mea-
surable process Z such that
E[sup
s≤T
(|Xns − Xs|2 + |Yns −Ys|2) +
∫ T
0
‖Zns − Zs‖2ds]→ 0 as n→ ∞.
Moreover,
E[sup
s≤T
(|Xs|2 + |Ys|2) +
∫ T
0
‖Zs‖2ds] < ∞.
By taking the limit with respect to n in equation (2.27) we obtain that (X,Y,Z) is a solution of
MF-BFSDE (2.25).
(ii) Uniqueness of the solution: Let U′ = (X′,Y′,Z′) be another solution to (2.25) and set
ΓT := E
[∫ T
0 {( f (s,U′s, ν′s)− f (s,Us, νs)) · (Y′s − Ys)
+(h(s,U′s, ν′s)− h(s,Us, νs)) · (X′s − Xs)
+[σ(s,U′s)− σ(s,Us),Z′s − Zs]} ds] .
(2.38)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to the product (X′T − XT) · (Y′T − YT) and taking expectation, we obtain
E[(X′T − XT) · (Y′T −YT)] = ΓT . (2.39)
In view of (H1′), (2.3), the Lipschitz continuity of f , h, σ and g, and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity, we have
ΓT = E[(X
′
T − XT) · (Y′T −YT)] ≥ k′E[|X′T − XT |2]− CνgE[|X′T − XT |]d(µ′T, µT)
≥ k′E[|X′T − XT |2]− CνgE[|X′T − XT |]E[|X′T − XT |2]
1
2
≥ (k′ − Cνg)E[|X′T − XT |2].
Therefore,
ΓT ≥ (k′ − Cνg)E[|X′T − XT |2]. (2.40)
On the other hand, we have
ΓT ≤ E
[∫ T
0 {A(s,Us,U′s, νs) + (Cν|X′s − Xs|+ Cν|Y′s − Ys|)d(νs, ν′s)} ds
]
.
But,
d(νs, ν
′
s) ≤
√
E[|X′s − Xs|2 + |Y′s −Ys|2].
Therefore, by the use of Young’s inequality three times we obtain
ΓT ≤ E
∫ T
0
{
−k(|X′s − Xs|2 + |Y′s −Ys|2) +
Cν
2
(2α+
1
α
)(|X′s − Xs|2 + |Y′s −Ys|2)
}
ds. (2.41)
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Now, combining (2.40) and (2.41) we obtain
0 ≤ (Cνg − k′)E[|X′T − XT |2] ≤ E[
∫ T
0
{
[
Cν
2
(2α+
1
α
)− k]|X′s − Xs|2+
[
Cν
2
(2α+
1
α
)− k]|Y′s − Ys|2
}
ds.
(2.42)
Since Cνg ,C
ν < min{2(√2− 1)k′,
√
2
2 k}, with α =
√
2
2 , all the coefficients in the inequality (2.42)
are negative. It follows that P-a.s. for any s ∈ [0, T], X′s = Xs, Y′s = Ys, and using the estimation
(2.37), we obtain Z′s = Zs, ds⊗ dP, which is the uniqueness of the solution of (2.25). 
Remark 2.4.
(i) Conditions (2.8) and (2.26) in Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 are only sufficient conditions. Whether
or not they are necessary does not seem an easy task. However, as it is well known, the
existence of a solution for the MF-BFSDEs (2.6) and (2.25) depends on several parameters
including the length T of the time horizon and the initial value x of the forward SDE (see
Example (3.25) below).
(ii) Conditions (2.8) and (2.26) can be improved if we consider Cνf ,C
ν
σ,C
ν
h instead of C
ν =
max{Cνf ,Cνσ,Cνh}.
3. THE NONZERO-SUM MEAN FILED GAME: THE OPEN-LOOP FRAMEWORK
In this section W = (Wt)t≤T is a one-dimension Brownian motion. For i = 1, . . . ,m, let U i :=
M2,mi , be the set of open-loop admissible controls for the player i. The set U := Πi=1,mU i, is
called of open-loop admissble strategies for the players. In the sequel, a stochastic process ρ =
(ρt(ω))t≤T with values in Rℓ1×ℓ2 is called bounded if
‖ρ‖ := sup
(t,ω)∈[0,T]×Ω
‖ρt(ω)‖ < ∞. (3.1)
Next, for u = (ui)1≤i≤m ∈ U , let Xu := (Xut )0≤t≤T be the Rn-valued process solution of the
following standard SDE of mean-field or McKean-Vlasov type.
Xut = x+
∫ t
0
{AsXus + ∑
k=1,m
Cksu
k
s + DsE[X
u
s ] + βs}ds+
∫ t
0
{σsXus + αs}dWs, (3.2)
where,
(i) A = (At)0≤t≤T, D = (Dt)0≤t≤T, β = (βt)0≤t≤T, α = (αt)0≤t≤T and Ck = (Ckt )0≤t≤T are
bounded and adapted stochastic processes with values respectively in Rn×n, Rn×n, Rn,
R
n and Rn×mk , k = 1, . . . ,m.
(ii) σ = (σt)0≤t≤T is an adapted process with values in Rn×n.
Next, to u = (ui)1≤i≤m ∈ U , we associate m payoffs Ji(u), i = 1, . . . ,m, of the form
Ji(u) :=
1
2{E[(XuT)⊤QiXuT ] + E[(XuT)⊤]RiE[XuT ]
+E[
∫ T
0 {(Xus )⊤MisXus + u⊤s N isus + E[Xus ]⊤ΓisE[Xus ]}ds]},
where, for any i = 1, . . . ,m,
(a) Mi = (Mit)0≤t≤T are bounded adapted symmetric non-negative matrices with values in
R
n×n,
(b) N i = (N it)0≤t≤T are bounded adapted symmetric positive matrices with values Rmi×mi .
Moreover, their inverses (N i)−1 := ((N it)−1)0≤t≤T are also bounded,
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(c) (Γit)0≤t≤T are bounded deterministic symmetric non-negative matrices with values in
R
n×n,
(d) Qi is a random bounded symmetric non-negative matrix FT-measurable and Ri is a con-
stant symmetric non-negative matrix, with values in Rn×n.
For i = 1, . . . ,m, Ji(u) is the cost associated with the player i when the collective strategy u =
(ui)1≤i≤m is implemented. The problem we address in this section is to find a Nash equilibrium
point (NEP) for the game, i.e., a collective control u∗ = (u∗1 , . . . , u
∗
n) for the players such that for
any i = 1, . . . ,m,
Ji(u
∗
1 , . . . , u
∗
m) ≤ Ji(u∗1 , . . . , u∗i−1, ui, u∗i+1, . . . , u∗m), for all ui ∈ U i. (3.3)
The meaning of the previous inequalities is that if the player i makes the decision to deviate
unilaterally from u∗i , then she is penalized since her cost is at least larger than the cost of using
u∗i . If m = 2 and J1 + J2 = 0, the game is called of zero-sum type and a NEP (u
∗
1 , u
∗
2) satisfies
J1(u
∗
1 , v2) ≤ J1(u∗1 , u∗2) ≤ J1(v1, u∗2)
for all v1 ∈ U 1 and v2 ∈ U 2.
For the sake of simplicity, in this section we only consider the case where the Brownian motion
is one-dimensional. Extension to the multi-dimensional case is straightforward.
For i = 1, . . . ,m, let us denote by Hi the Hamiltonian associated with the i-th player which is
defined by
Hi(t,ω, x, u1, . . . , um, ζ, pi, qi) := p
⊤
i (At(ω)x+ ∑
m
k=1 C
k
t (ω)u
k + Dtζ + βt)
+ 12 (x
⊤Mit(ω)x+ u⊤i N
i
t(ω)ui + ζ
⊤Γitζ) + (σ⊤t x+ αt)qit,
where ui ∈ Rmi , zi ∈ Rn and ζ ∈ Rn (ζ is the variable which stands for the expectation).
For i = 1, . . . ,m, let u˜i be the functions defined by
u˜i(t,ω, pi) := −(N it)−1(Cit)⊤pi, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.4)
The measurable functions u˜i, i = 1, . . . ,m, satisfy for all i = 1, . . . ,m and all ui ∈ Rmi
Hi(t,ω, x, (u˜
j(t,ω, pj))1≤j≤m, ζ, pi, qi)
≤ Hi(t,ω, x, u˜1(t,ω, p1), . . . , u˜i−1(t,ω, pi−1), ui, u˜i+1(t,ω, pi+1), . . . , u˜m(t,ω, zm), ζ, pi, qi).
The following proposition is a first step toward the proof of existence of a NEP for the game.
Proposition 3.1. Let the P−measurable processes (X, (p1, q1), . . . , (pm, qm)) be such that X, pi, i =
1, . . . ,m belong to S2,n and qi, i = 1, . . . ,m belong to H2,n. Then, they solve the following MF-BFSDE,
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Xt = x+
∫ t
0 {AsXs + ∑mk=1 Cks u˜k(s, pks) + DsE[Xs] + βs}ds
+
∫ t
0{σsXus + αs}dWs;
pit = (Q
iXT + R
i
E[XT ]) +
∫ T
t {A⊤s pis + MisXs + E[D⊤s pis]
+ΓisE[Xs] + σ
⊤
s q
i
s}ds−
∫ T
t q
i
sdWs, i = 1, . . . ,m.
(3.5)
if and only if the admissible collective control u˜ := (u˜j)1≤j≤m = ((u˜j(t,ω, p
j
t))0≤t≤T)1≤j≤m (u˜j is given
by (3.4)) is a Nash equilibrium point for the mean-field nonzero-sum linear quadratic stochastic differential
game.
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In the BFSDE (3.5), X is the optimal trajectory and (pi, qi)1≤i≤m are the associated adjoint pro-
cesses ([AD11,CK95,Ben82]).
Proof. (i) The condition is sufficient. The fact that u˜ is an open-loop strategy for the players is an
immediate consequence of the boundedness of Cit, (N
i
t)
−1 and the fact that (pit)0≤t≤T belongs to
M2,n for any i = 1, . . . ,m. Next, we will show the inequality (3.3) for i = 1. The other cases can be
treated in the same manner. Consider u1 = (u1(s))0≤s≤T ∈ U 1, uˆ = (u1, u˜2, . . . , u˜m). We should
show that J1(u˜) ≤ J1(uˆ).
Indeed,
J1(uˆ)− J1(u˜) = J1(u1, u˜2, . . . , u˜m)− J1(u˜) =
1
2
{E[(XuˆT)⊤Q1XuˆT ] + E[(XuˆT)⊤]R1E[XuˆT ]]−E[(XT)⊤Q1XT + E[(XT)⊤]R1E[XT]]}
+
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
{(Xuˆs )⊤M1sXuˆs + u1(s)⊤N1s u1(s)− X⊤s M1sXs − u˜1(s)⊤N1s .u1(s)
+ E[Xuˆs ]
⊤Γ1sE[Xuˆs ]−E[Xs]⊤Γ1sE[Xs]}ds].
But, for any symmetric non-negative matrix Σ (i.e. v⊤Σv ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ Rk), we have
θ⊤1 Σθ1 − θ⊤2 Σθ2 = (θ1 − θ2)⊤Σ(θ1 − θ2) + 2(θ1 − θ2)⊤Σθ2 ≥ 2(θ1 − θ2)⊤Σθ2.
Therefore,
J1(uˆ)− J1(u˜) ≥E{(XuˆT − XT)⊤Q1XT}+ E[(XuˆT − XT)⊤]R1E[XT]
+ E{
∫ T
0
{(Xuˆs − Xs)⊤M1s .Xs + (u1(s)− u˜1(s))⊤N1s u˜1(s)
+ (E[Xuˆs ]−E[Xs])⊤Γ1sE[Xs]}ds}. (3.6)
since the matrices Q1, R1, M1t , N
1
t and Γ
1
t are symmetric non-negative.
We will show that the right-hand side of (3.6) is zero. Indeed, since p1T = Q
1XT + R
1
E[XT ] and
(p1, q1) is a solution of a backward SDE of mean-field type, then by Itoˆ’s formula we have
(XuˆT − XT)⊤p1T =
∫ T
0 {−(Xuˆs − Xs)⊤{A⊤s p1s + M1sXs + E[D⊤s p1s ] + Γ1sE[Xs] + σ⊤s q1s}
+(Xuˆs − Xs)⊤A⊤s p1s + (u1(s)− u˜1(s))⊤(C1s )⊤p1s + E[Xuˆs − Xs]⊤D⊤s p1s}ds
+
∫ t
0 (X
uˆ
s − Xs)⊤σ⊤s q1sds+
∫ t
0 (X
uˆ
s − Xs)⊤σ⊤s p1sdWs+∫ t
0 (X
uˆ
s − Xs)⊤q1sdWs,
(3.7)
since, for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Xuˆt − Xt =
∫ t
0 {As(Xuˆs − Xs) + C1s (u1(s)− u˜1(s)) + DsE[Xuˆs − Xs]}ds+
∫ t
0 σs(X
uˆ
s − Xs)dWs.
Simplifying terms in (3.7) and taking expectation, noting that the stochastic integrals are martin-
gales, we obtain
E[(XuˆT − XT)⊤p1T] = E{(XuˆT − XT)⊤Q1XT ] + E[(XuˆT − XT)⊤]R1E[XT ]}
= E[
∫ T
0 {−(Xuˆs − Xs)⊤{M1sXs + Γ1sE[Xs]}+ (u1(s)− u˜1(s))⊤(C1s )⊤p1s}ds].
(3.8)
Finally, insert the right-hand side of (3.8) in (3.6) and take into account that
(C1s )
⊤p1s + N1s u˜1(s) = 0
(see the definition of u˜1 given by (3.4) ) to obtain that
J1(u1, u˜2, . . . , u˜m)− J1(u˜) ≥ 0.
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(ii) The condition is necessary. Suppose the game has a Nash equilibrium point u˜ := (u˜j)1≤j≤m =
((u˜j(t,ω, p
j
t))0≤t≤T)1≤j≤m and denote by X˜ its associated optimal trajectory. Then obviously X˜
belongs to S2,n. Next, for i = 1, . . . ,m, let (pi, qi) be the solution of the following backward SDE:
pi ∈ S2,n and qi ∈ H2,n;
pit = (Q
iX˜T + R
i
E[X˜T ]) +
∫ T
t
{A⊤s pis + MisX˜s + E[D⊤s pis]
+ ΓisE[X˜s] + σ
⊤
s q
i
s}ds−
∫ T
t
qisdWs, t ≤ T.
(3.9)
The solution of (3.9) exists, by the results in [BLP09]. Next, by themaximumprinciple (see [AD11],
Theorem 3.1), for any u := (uj)1≤j≤m ∈ U , we have
d
dui
Hi(t,ω, X˜t, u˜1, . . . , u˜i−1, ui, u˜i+1, . . . , um,E[X˜t], pi, qi)(ui − u˜i) ≥ 0 P-a.s. (3.10)
for all t ∈ [0, T], i = 1, . . . ,m. That is, for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
((Cit)
⊤pit + N it u˜it)(uit − u˜it) ≥ 0. (3.11)
Since uit ∈ Rmi is arbitrary, we obtain
u˜i(t,ω, pi) := −(N it)−1(Cit)⊤pi, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Inserting that value of u˜i into (3.9), we have that (X˜, (p1, q1), . . . , (pm, qm)) satisfies MF-BFSDE
(3.5). 
Next, we are going to provide conditions on the data of the differential game in such a way
that a NEP exists. So let us consider the following assumptions:
(H2)

(i) For any i = 1, . . . ,m, the matrices Ci and N i are time independent. We set
Ki := Ci(N i)−1(Ci)⊤.
(ii) There exist constants η1 > 0, η2 > 0 such that for any x ∈ Rn,
x⊤(∑mi=1 KiQi)x ≥ η1|x|2 and x⊤(∑mi=1 KiMit)x ≥ η2|x|2,
for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P-a.s.
(iii) For any i = 1, . . . ,m, KiA⊤t = A⊤t Ki, KiD⊤t = D⊤t Ki and Kiσ⊤t = σ⊤t Ki,
for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P-a.s.
Note that in the case when n = 1, those assumptions are rather easy to check.
Let us now consider the following MF-BFSDE.
X, Y˜ ∈ S2,n and Z ∈ S2,n ;
Xt = x+
∫ t
0{AsXs − Y˜s + DsE[Xs] + βs}ds+
∫ t
0{σsXus + αs}dWs ,
Y˜t = (∑
m
k=1 K
iQi)XT + (∑
m
k=1 K
iRi)E[XT]−∫ T
t {−A⊤s Y˜s − (∑k=1,m KiMis)Xs −E[D⊤s Y˜s]− σ⊤s Z˜s}ds−
∫ T
t Z˜sdWs.
(3.12)
Note that if (X, (p1, q1), . . . , (pm, qm)) is a solution of (3.5) then, under (H2), the process (X,Y =
∑
m
i=1 K
ipi,Z = ∑mi=1 K
iqi) is a solution of the BFSDE (3.12). This is exactly the origin of (3.12).
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The functions f , g, h and σ, introduced in Section 1, and related to the BFSDEs (3.12) are
(a) f (t, x, y, z, ν) = Atx− y+ Dt
∫
Rn+n
xν(dx, dy) + βt;
(b) σ(t, x, y, z, ν) = σtx+ αt ;
(c) g(x, µ) = (∑mk=1 K
iQi)x+ (∑mk=1 K
iRi)
∫
Rn
xµ(dx).
(d) For any t, x, y, z, ν, if (ξ1, ξ2) is a random vector on (Ω,F ,P)whose law is ν, then
h(t, x, y, z, ν) := −A⊤t y− (
m
∑
k=1
KiMis)x−E[Dtξ2]− σ⊤z.
To proceed, let us show that f is uniformly Lipschitz w.r.t. ν. Let ξ = (ξ1, ξ2) be a random vector
whose distribution is ν ∈ M2(Rn+n). We have,
f (t, x, y, z, ν) = Atx− y+ DtE[ξ1] + βt.
Next, let ν′ ∈ M2(Rn+n) be given and let ξ ′ = (ξ ′1, ξ ′2) be a pair of random variables defined on
the same probability as (ξ1, ξ2) whose law is ν
′. Therefore,
| f (t, x, y, z, ν)− f (t, x, y, z, ν′)| ≤ ‖D‖|E[ξ1 − ξ ′1]|
≤ ‖D‖
√
E[|ξ1 − ξ ′1|2]
≤ ‖D‖
√
E[|ξ − ξ ′|2].
Since ξ and ξ ′ are arbitrary, it holds that
| f (t, x, y, z, ν)− f (t, x, y, z, ν′)| ≤ ‖D‖ inf
ξ,ξ ′
√
E[|ξ − ξ ′|2] = ‖D‖d(ν, ν′). (3.13)
Finally, linearity implies that f satisfies (2.5). Similar estimates can be used for h and g to show
that they satisfy (2.5) and (2.4), respectively.
The operator A defined in (2.7) reads
A(t, u, u′, ν) = −|y− y′|2 − (∑mk=1 KiMis)|x− x′|2. (3.14)
Therefore, under (H2), A and g satisfy Assumption (H1′) with k = min{1, η2}, k′ = η1 (η1 and η2
are defined in (H2)).
Next, the Lipschitz constants of f , g, h and σ w.r.t. x, y and z are (see (3.1))
Cxf = ‖A‖, Cyf = 1, Czf = 0, C
y
h = ‖A‖, Cxh = ‖(
m
∑
k=1
KiMi)‖, Czh = ‖σ‖, (3.15)
Cxσ = ‖σ‖, Cyσ = Czσ = 0 and Cxg = ‖(
m
∑
k=1
KiQi)‖. (3.16)
On the other hand, as for f in (3.13),
Cνf = ‖D‖,Cνh = ‖D‖,Cνσ = 0 and Cνg = ‖(
m
∑
k=1
KiRi)‖. (3.17)
We have the following
Proposition 3.2. Assume that (H2) holds and
(i) ‖(
m
∑
k=1
KiRi)‖ < min{2(
√
2− 1)η1,
√
2
2
,
√
2
2
η2};
(ii) ‖D‖ < min{2(
√
2− 1)η1,
√
2
2
,
√
2
2
η2}.
(3.18)
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Then, there exist P−measurable processes (X, (p1, q1), ..., (pm, qm)) such that X and pi, i = 1, . . . ,m
belong to S2,n and qi, i = 1, . . . ,m belong toH2,n which solve the Backward-Forward stochastic differential
equation of mean-field type (3.5).
Proof. Recall the BFSDE (3.12) is
Xt = x+
∫ t
0{AsXs − Y˜s + DsE[Xs] + βs}ds+
∫ t
0{σsXs + αs}dWs ,
Y˜t = (∑k=1,m K
iQi)XT + (∑k=1,m K
iRi)E[XT]−∫ T
t {−A⊤s Y˜s − (∑k=1,m KiMis)Xs −E[D⊤s Y˜s]− σ⊤s Z˜s}ds−
∫ T
t Z˜sdWs.
(3.19)
When (H2) holds,
A(t, u, u′, ν) = −|y− y′|2 − (
m
∑
k=1
KiMis)|x− x′|2
≤ −|y− y′|2 − η2|x− x′|2
(3.20)
which means that k = min{1, η2}. For any x, x′ ∈ Rn, ν ∈ M2(Rn ×Rn)
g(x, ν)− g(x′, ν)) · (x− x′) = x⊤( ∑
i=1,m
KiQi)x ≥ η1|x|2 (3.21)
which means that k′ = η1. Now, under conditions (3.2) we can apply Theorem 2.3, to deduce the
existence of P−measurable processes (X, Y˜, Z˜) which solve the MF-BFSDE(3.19).
We will now prove that when (ii) is satisfied, this solution is unique without using Theorem
2.3. This is due to the fact that in this specific case, uniqueness is obtained in an easy way without
strong conditions on the Lipschitz constants of f , h, g and σ as it is the case in Theorem 2.3.
Assume there is another solution (X′,Y′,Z′) of (3.19) and set
∆X = X− X′, ∆Y = Y˜− Y˜′ and ∆Z = Z˜− Z˜′.
We have, for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
∆Xt =
∫ t
0
{As∆Xs − ∆Ys + DsE[∆Xs]}ds+
∫ t
0
σs∆XsdWs
∆Yt = (
m
∑
k=1
KiQi)∆XT + (
m
∑
k=1
KiRi)E[∆XT ]−
∫ T
t
{−A⊤s ∆Ys − (
m
∑
k=1
KiMis)∆Xs −E[D⊤s ∆Ys]− σ⊤s ∆Zs}ds−
∫ T
t
∆ZsdWs.
Next, applying Itoˆ’s formula to ∆X⊤∆Y and taking expectation we obtain
E[∆X⊤T ∆YT ] = E{∆X⊤T (
m
∑
k=1
KiQi)∆XT + E[∆XT ]
⊤(
m
∑
k=1
KiRi)E[∆XT ]}
= E[
∫ T
0
{−|∆Ys |2 − ∆X⊤s (
m
∑
k=1
KiMis)∆Xs}ds]. (3.22)
This gives
E[η1∆X
⊤
T ∆XT ]− CνgE[∆XT ]⊤E[∆XT ] ≤ E[
∫ T
0
{−|∆Ys |2 − ∆X⊤s (
m
∑
k=1
KiMis)∆Xs}ds].
Thus, since Cνg = ‖(∑mk=1 KiRi)‖ < η1, by continuity of the processes we obtain
P-a.s., ∀t ≤ T, Xt = X′t and Yt = Y′t
and finally Z′t = Zt, dt⊗ dP-a.e. Thus, the solution of (3.19) is unique.
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Next, by the results of [BLP09], for i = 1, . . . ,m, there exists (pi, qi) ∈ S2,n ×H2,n solution of
the following standard BSDE: P-a.s., ∀t ≤ T,
pit = Q
iXT + R
i
E[XT ] +
∫ T
t {A⊤s pis +MisXs + E[D⊤s pis] + σ⊤s qis}ds−
∫ T
t q
i
sdWs.
Therefore, the process (X,Y = ∑mi=1 K
ipi,Z = ∑mi=1 K
iqi) is a solution of (3.19). As the solution of
this latter is unique, it holds that Y˜ = ∑mi=1 K
ipi and Z˜ = ∑mi=1 K
iqi. Replace now Y˜ (resp. Z˜) with
∑
m
i=1 K
ipi (resp. ∑mi=1 K
iqi) in (3.12) to obtain that (X, (pi, qi)1≤i≤m) satisfy the FBSDE (3.5). The
proof is complete. 
As an immediate consequence of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we give the main result of this sec-
tion.
Theorem 3.3. Assume that (H2) holds and the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) ‖(
m
∑
k=1
KiRi)‖ < min{2(
√
2− 1)η1,
√
2
2
,
√
2
2
η2};
(ii) ‖D‖ < min{2(
√
2− 1)η1,
√
2
2
,
√
2
2
η2}.
(3.23)
Then, the collective strategy u˜ = ((−(N i)−1(Ci)⊤pi(t))t≤T)1≤i≤m, where (X, (pi, qi)1≤i≤m) is the so-
lution of FBSDE (3.5), is a Nash eqilibrium point for the mean-field LQ differential game.
Example 3.4 (Nonexistence of a Nash Equilibrium Point of specific game problem without condi-
tion (3.23)).
We give an example to illustrate that when (3.23) is not satisfied, the game may not have an
equilibrium point. The idea is inspired by the conclusion shown in Section 6 of [Eis82] and Ex-
ample (4.b) in [Ham99].
Consider following game problem:
dXt =
{
Xt −E[Xt] + u(t)
[
1
−2
]
+ v(t)
[ −2
1
]}
dt+ dWt, t ≤ T;X0 = (1, 2)⊤. (3.24)
Let J1 and J2 be the cost functionals defined by:
J1(u, v) =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(u(t))2dt+ (X1T)
2] and J2(u, v) =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(v(t))2dt+ (X2T)
2]
where u, v areR-valued andFt- adapted process. Here, the associatedD = −1 and then ‖D‖ = 1,
which does not satisfy (3.23)-(ii). The Mean-Field FBSDE associated with the game is, for every
t ≤ T,
Xt =
[
1
2
]
+
∫ t
0
{Xs −E[Xs] +
[
1
−2
]
[−1 2]p1s +
[ −2
1
]
[ 2 − 1]p2s}ds+Wt;
p1t =
[
X1T
0
]
+
∫ T
t
{p1s −E[p1s ]}ds−
∫ T
t
q1sdWs;
p2t =
[
0
X2T
]
+
∫ T
t
{p2s −E[p2s ]}ds−
∫ T
t
q2sdWs.
(3.25)
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Next, set Y = (E(Xt))t≤T, pi = (E[pi(t)])t≤T, i = 1, 2 . Taking expectation in (3.25), we obtain,
for every t ≤ T,
Yt =
[
1
2
]
+
∫ t
0
{[
1
−2
]
[−1 2]p1s +
[ −2
1
]
[ 2 − 1]p2s
}
ds;
p1t =
[
Y1T
0
]
, p2t =
[
0
Y2T
]
.
(3.26)
which is a deterministic system. With the previous system is associated the following determin-
istic nonzero-sum game
dYt =
{
u(t)
[
1
−2
]
+ v(t)
[ −2
1
]}
dt, t ≤ T,
Y0 =
[
1
2
]
,
(3.27)
and the cost functionals are given by
J¯1(u, v) =
1
2
{
∫ T
0
(u(t))2dt+ (Y1T)
2} and J¯2(u, v) = 1
2
{
∫ T
0
(v(t))2dt+ (Y2T)
2}. (3.28)
The problem (3.27)-(3.28) is a deterministic nonzero-sum game. Noting that if the game prob-
lem (3.24) has a Nash equilibrium point, by Proposition 3.1, the MF-BFSDE (3.25) has a solution.
Hence, obviously the FBODE (3.26) has a solution, which means that the deterministic game prob-
lem (3.27)-(3.28) has a Nash equilibrium point. However, when we choose T = 1, following the
conclusion in [Eis82], the game (3.27)-(3.28) does not have a Nash equilibrium point and then the
equation (3.26) does not have a solution. Therefore, the MF-BFSDE (3.25) does not have a solution
for T = 1, from which we deduce that the game (3.24) does not have a Nash equilibrium point.
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